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Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Discipline of
the Spending Clause vs. the False Discipline
of Campaign Finance Reform
Bradley A. Smith*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1796, Congressman James Madison proposed that the federal government undertake a survey for a national post road from
Maine to Georgia, which he suggested would be, “the commencement of an extensive work.”1 Madison’s proposal drew the attention of his long-time friend and confidant, Thomas Jefferson, then
in temporary retirement at Monticello. In private correspondence,
Jefferson inquired of Madison, “[h]ave you considered all the consequences of your proposition respecting post roads? I view it as a
source of boundless patronage to the executive, jobbing to members of Congress and their friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money.”2
Although Madison’s proposal appeared to fall under a power
specifically granted to Congress by the Constitution, “[t]o establish [p]ost [o]ffices and post [r]oads,”3 Jefferson nonetheless opposed the measure as being beyond Congress’s enumerated
powers. “Does the power to establish post roads,” asked Jefferson,
“mean that you shall make the roads, or only select from those already made those on which there shall be a post? If the term be
equivocal, (and I really do not think it so) which is the safest construction?”4 Jefferson argued that the more liberal construction
would open the door to wholesale spending by Congress, in ways
that harbored ill for representative government. “[I]t will be a
* Commissioner, Federal Election Commission, and Professor of Law, Capital University Law School (on leave). The views expressed herein are to be attributed solely to the
author and not to the Federal Election Commission or its commissioners. I thank Stephen
M. Hoersting and Victoria E. Wu for their research assistance.
1 Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., Sic Et Non: Thomas Jefferson and Internal Improvement, 7
J. EARLY REPUB. 335, 339 (1987).
2 Letter from Jefferson to Madison (Mar. 6, 1796), in 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at
923 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
4 Letter from Jefferson to Madison (Mar. 6, 1796), in 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at
924 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
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scene of eternal scramble among the members who can get the
most money wasted in their state, and they will always get most
who are meanest.”5 Jefferson also expressed concern whether the
national government could ever be truly sensitive to local concerns
and opinions, rhetorically asking, “[w]hat will it be when a member of N[ew] H[ampshire] is to mark out a road for Georgia?”6
In contrast, Jefferson’s former cabinet colleague, Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton, had no constitutional qualms
about federal spending for road construction.7 Indeed, Hamilton
favored an expansive federal role generally, and interpreted the
Constitution in that manner.8
Today, Jefferson’s concerns seem nothing short of quaint. The
federal government spends over $1.8 trillion per annum, with federal highway spending alone anticipated to exceed $26.9 billion in
fiscal year 2001.9 The idea that one should interpret Congress’s
enumerated powers, or its authority to spend money to carry them
out narrowly, scarcely remains an element of public discourse.
Quite the contrary, a substantial percentage of Congress’s extraordinary expenditures are made in support of no enumerated
power whatsoever, but merely under a vague constitutional grant
of power that we now call the “Spending Clause.” Through this
spending, the federal government extends its reach into virtually
all aspects of human endeavor and local politics. To cite just a few
examples, the government attempts to influence the individual
consumption of alcohol;10 how doctors practice medicine;11 how
counselors advise patients;12 and numerous other areas that
would seem remote even under the expansive view that the courts
have adopted of the Commerce Clause.13
Today, this core power to spend goes more or less unchallenged. Most scholarship accepts the expansive, “Hamiltonian”
view of the power. Current legal controversies over the spending
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Oct.-Nov., 1799), in 23 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 599, 601-02 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1976). Further,
though it appears he might have had doubts that the Constitution would allow Congress to
actually operate roads, he probably would have favored a constitutional amendment to give
the federal government that power. Id. at 603 (suggesting a constitutional amendment
should be had so that Congress could “open,” as opposed to merely spend money for,
canals).
8 See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-24 (1994) [hereinafter Engdahl, The Spending Power].
9 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FINAL
SEQUESTRATION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 9 (2001).
10 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
11 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S.
610 (1986).
12 See New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354 (1983).
13 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
5
6
7
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power tend to be concerned with whether, or to what extent, the
federal government may condition the receipt of funds on the
agreement of individual recipients and other program beneficiaries to engage (or to refrain from engaging) in particular behaviors; and on whether, or to what extent, the policies behind such
conditional federal spending may be used to preempt state laws
which would otherwise frustrate the federal policies at issue.14
Given the Supreme Court’s steadfast adoption of an expansive,
“Hamiltonian” interpretation of the spending power,15 this discussion of what is called the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions”
has a certain practical bent that may be missing from work which
would go further toward a full-scale reconsideration of the Spending Clause. Furthermore, a robust doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions may go a long way towards restricting federal spending
and the reach of even the Hamiltonian view of the spending
power, a concern at the heart of this modest essay. However, beyond examination of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the
core Hamiltonian view of the spending power is generally
unchallenged.
In this symposium, surrounded by scholars of the first rank,
many of whom have devoted substantial efforts to understanding
and interpreting Congress’s spending power, my contribution
must necessarily be modest. I will refrain from the difficult task of
attempting to dissect the efforts of the Supreme Court to explain
or limit the spending power. I will not attempt to argue whether
or not the prevailing, so-called “Hamiltonian” view of the spending
power is “right” or “wrong,” either as a matter of textual interpretation or of founding intent. Rather, I will merely suggest that this
prevailing interpretation, with or without the limitations of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, places pressures on the
American system of representation that are not easily overcome.
In particular, an expansive interpretation of the Spending Clause
fosters political rent-seeking, that is, the seeking of special favors
from government, through the democratic process. These pressures come to the fore in my area of expertise, campaign finance
law, for campaign finance regulation is largely an effort to control
political rent-seeking. However, most proposals for campaign finance regulation run directly counter to the First Amendment,
14 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1919 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Federal Spending]; Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Albert J. Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111 (1987); D.
Bruce LaPierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982).
15 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Dole, 483 U.S. 203; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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and to a smoothly functioning system of representation. I have,
unfortunately, no solution to offer—at least not one which would
be politically palatable in these times, or which might not create
other, competing pressures on democratic self-government in the
United States. However, perhaps merely identifying the problem
can be a step forward in our thinking, not only about campaign
finance, but also about the purpose of democratic self-government
more generally.
Part II of this paper reviews the general contours of the
Spending Clause as it has come to be understood, contrasting the
Hamiltonian and Madisonian views and suggesting that the triumph of Hamiltonianism is a part of a massive redefinition of the
relationship between the federal government, the states, and the
people. Part III discusses how the Hamiltonian interpretation creates problems for representative democracy, and discusses campaign finance regulation as a desperate but doomed effort to
resolve these dilemmas. I conclude by suggesting that the prevailing interpretation of the Spending Clause has helped to bring us
to a political crossroads from which, given current attitudes, there
is no obvious way out: it is, I suggest, Hamiltonianism at wits’
end.
II.

EVOLUTION

OF A

CLAUSE

A. The Source of the Spending Power
Some level of authority for Congress to authorize expenditures of money appears to have been considered self-evident to the
drafters of the Constitution. Without such power, the Constitution’s provisions authorizing Congress to “borrow money,”16 or to
“lay and collect [t]axes,”17 or to “support Armies”18 and “maintain a
Navy,”19 for example, would make no real sense. Yet, except for
Congress’s authorization to draw compensation “paid out of the
Treasury of the United States,”20 the Constitution grants Congress no specific power to spend money for anything. The power
appears to be assumed within the framework of the Constitution
as an obvious extension of Congress’s authority to carry out various enumerated actions—the “necessary and proper” Clause of
Article I, Section 8.21 If congressional spending is limited to that
which is “necessary and proper” to effect Congress’s enumerated
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (The Congress shall have the Power, “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers
. . . .”).
16
17
18
19
20
21
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powers, then Congress’s power to spend must be quite limited,
even under a relatively expansive definition of “necessary and
proper.” As for spending beyond that pertaining to enumerated
powers, there is some question about the source of any such
power, and correspondingly, how broad this power, if it exists at
all, might be. The most common interpretation is that the locus of
the spending power, beyond that necessary and proper to effectuating enumerated powers, is implied in Article I, Section 8, Clause
1, which authorizes Congress to “pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”22 Professor David Engdahl, however, argues that the power is more appropriately found in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, which grants
Congress the power to “dispose of . . . Property belonging to the
United States.”23 Yet another possibility might be an implied
power under Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, which provides that
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law.”24
Two of these possible sources of the spending power place no
apparent constraints on that power, at least not without reference
to other portions of the document. Indeed, the Appropriations
Clause of Article I, Section 9, only grants the power at all through
the pregnant inference that money may be drawn from the Treasury if appropriated by law, and offers no guidance as to any potential restraints on the power. It appears that no reported case
has relied upon this clause, nor has any major commentary
treated it as the source of the spending power. Similarly, the
courts have not adopted Engdahl’s reliance on Article IV, nor does
Engdahl’s theory place inherent restraints on the subjects for
which Congress may appropriate funds. Indeed, Engdahl argues
that Article IV’s clear lack of any restraint on the purposes for
which funds may be disposed is both the correct Hamiltonian interpretation of the spending power and, correspondingly, a virtue
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936).
Engdahl, The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 50-51; David E. Engdahl, The Basis
of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215 (1995) [hereinafter Engdahl, The Basis
of the Spending Power].
24 So far as I know, others have not sought to find the spending power in this clause; I
presume that this is because either my research or logic is faulty, but I leave open the
possibility of an original thought. The clause is generally viewed as a check on the authority of the executive to spend. See Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (or the President’s
Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 140
(1999). By implication, this view suggests that, technically, the power to spend is not a
congressional power at all, but is actually an executive power provided for under the President’s duty to see that “the Laws be faithfully executed.” See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3, cl. 1.). Our concern remains with the scope of the projects for which Congress may
appropriate money, however.
22
23
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to rooting the power in Article IV.25 However, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1, is the provision on which the federal courts have hung
their collective hat,26 and where scholars have generally assumed
that the authority is found.27
Finding the spending authority in Article I, Section 8 is important, because Article I, Section 8 contains language which is
susceptible to interpretation as either a limit on the spending
power or a potential extension of that power. The central language
in debates over the scope of the spending power hinges on what is
meant by Congress’s authority, in Article I, Section 8, to “provide
for the . . . general Welfare.” The question, in particular, is
whether this language expands or contracts congressional power
beyond the powers enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution.
Two major schools of thought have existed since the Founding, as
indicated by the names given to their respective positions: the
“Madisonian” view, for followers of James Madison, and the
“Hamiltonian” view, named for the first Secretary of the Treasury.28 I will not attempt a full and thorough explication of either
view or the various nuances that might exist within each camp,29
but a brief summary of each view is important for our purposes.

25 Engdahl, The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 52. Engdahl does not see this formulation as leading to unchecked federal power—quite the contrary, he believes that separating the spending power from Article I, Section 8, with its “general Welfare” clause, does
away with the mistaken idea that Congress may engage in non-fiscal measures, where it
otherwise lacks enumerated powers under the Constitution, on the theory that it has broad
non-fiscal power to “provide for the . . . general Welfare.” Id.
26 See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. at 64; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
27 See, e.g., Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 14, at 1919; Rosenthal,
supra note 14 at 1111. Finding any free-standing spending power in the general welfare
“clause” is more problematic than most courts and scholars seem to think. A most cursory
reading reveals that the “General Welfare Clause” is not really a clause at all, but merely a
phrase within a clause. Hence it would seem clearly to be a limitation rather than a grant
of power. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL FOR
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL BANK (Feb., 15 1791), reprinted in DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 191 (1994).
28 The two men collaborated, of course, on writing The Federalist Papers in an effort to
explain and bolster support for the Constitution during the ratification phase in the states.
29 Such discussions can be found in e.g., Renz, supra note 24, at 103-142; Engdahl,
The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 5-26; Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1112; Butler, 297
U.S. at 63-78; id. at 79-88 (Stone, J., dissenting). Some have suggested that there are really
three interpretations of the clause: the Madisonian interpretation, and “strong” and “weak”
Hamiltonian interpretations. The “strong” Hamiltonian interpretation finds in the “general
Welfare” clause the power for Congress to regulate generally, even beyond the enumerated
powers that follow in the subsequent clauses of Paragraph 8. The “weak” Hamiltonian position finds no such general, regulatory power, but does hold that Congress has broad authority to spend for the general welfare. See Renz, supra note 24, at 103, 124. Given that this
“strong” interpretation has not been found persuasive by the courts or most commentators,
and that we are primarily concerned here with congressional spending, rather than direct
regulation, I will not devote space to this “strong” Hamiltonian position.

R
R

R
R
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B. The Conflicting Views, Briefly Described
The Madisonian view of Article I, Section 8 holds that Congress’s power to spend for the “general Welfare” is limited to effectuating Congress’s enumerated powers. In this view, the inclusion
of the General Welfare Clause serves to limit Congress’s power,
rather than to expand it. Indeed, Madison himself often evinced
nothing short of scorn for interpretations of the General Welfare
language that would expand Congress’s powers beyond those enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. For example, in Federalist
No. 41, he wrote:
It has been urged and echoed that the power ‘to . . . provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United States,’
amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power
which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or
general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress
under which these writers labor for objections [to the Constitution], than their stooping to such a misconstruction . . . .
[W]hat color can the objection have, when a specification of the
objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows
and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon?
. . . For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included
in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor
common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain
and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the
general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound
and mislead, is an absurdity . . . .30

Madison reiterated this view throughout his lifetime. For example, he wrote in 1800 that any interpretation of the General
Welfare Clause as a grant of powers beyond those otherwise enumerated would lead to the creation of a government, “without the
limitations formed by a particular enumeration of powers.”31 He
continued:
The true and fair construction of this expression [“general Welfare”], both in the original and existing federal compacts, appears . . . too obvious to be mistaken. In both the Congress is
authorized to provide money for the common defence and general welfare. In both, is subjoined to this authority an enumeration of the cases to which their powers shall extend . . . .
Whenever, therefore, money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied to a particular measure, a question
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 262-63 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in
JONATHAN ELLIOTT, 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 552 (1891).
30
31
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arises whether the particular measure be within the enumerated authorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money requisite
for it may be applied to it. If it be not, no such application can be
made. This [is the] fair and obvious interpretation . . . .32

Madison’s approach, of course, would have strictly confined congressional spending, even in light of the constitutional authorization for Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated]
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”33
The contrasting Hamiltonian view of Article I, Section 8, concludes that the General Welfare Clause provides a broad grant of
power for Congress to spend, effectively, for any purpose. Hamilton viewed the General Welfare Clause as a separate grant of authority, if not to regulate, at least to spend. Wrote Hamilton: “The
terms ‘general Welfare’ were doubtless intended to signify more
than was expressed or imported in those which preceded; otherwise, numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a nation would
have been left without a provision.”34 Hamilton went on to argue
the phrase “general Welfare” was “susceptible neither of specification nor of definition. It is, therefore, of necessity, left to the discretion of the National Legislature to pronounce upon the objects
which concern the general welfare, and for which, under that
description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper.”35
In sum, under the Hamiltonian interpretation, the General
Welfare Clause is the only limit on an otherwise plenary spending
power.36 However, because the legislature is the sole determinant
of what constitutes the general welfare, the clause provides no
real limit whatsoever, nor even guidance to those who would wield
the spending power. This appears to be exactly what Hamilton
had in mind.37 Like Madison, Hamilton held steadfastly to his
view of the spending power throughout his lifetime.38
32 Id. See also, e.g., James Madison, Speech in Congress (Feb. 2, 1791), reprinted in 6
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 19, 28 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also Letter from
James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 411, 418-19 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
34 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 5, 1791), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 294, 371 (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1885).
35 Id. at 372.
36 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1125.
37 Engdahl, The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 12 (“The first step toward understanding Hamilton’s view of the spending power, therefore, is to recognize that the Constitution’s principle of enumerated powers does not countenance—but in fact repels—. . . [the]
mistaken conclusion that some matters, some activities or events, are shut off from the
federal government’s attention . . . .”).
38 See, e.g., id. at 5-24.

R
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Of course, the debate over the extent of the spending power
was not restricted to the two founding giants. Rather, it simmered
throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth.
Its importance was limited in part by the relatively small size of
the federal government, and the reluctance of the federal government to engage in deficit spending outside of wartime. Shifting
political demands and fortunes also influenced both the tone of the
debate and which view held the upper hand at any particular
time.39 The influential jurist Joseph Story was an early and eloquent advocate of the Hamiltonian view,40 and later advocates included Justice Holmes, at least indirectly,41 the eminent counsel
and later Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 42 as the
Hamiltonian interpretation gradually asserted its dominance.
However, the Madisonian view retained influential defenders well
into the twentieth century.43
C. The Hamiltonian Victory
From a judicial standpoint, the core issue was finally settled
in a series of cases involving “New Deal” programs. The first of
these, United States v. Butler,44 involved a challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which provided for federal subsidies to farmers who agreed to reduce their planted acreage.45 The
Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the Hamiltonian reading of
the Spending Clause.46 Whether the justices applied it correctly is
another matter, as the Court reached the rather Madisonian conclusion that the spending was not in furtherance of the “general
Welfare,” and so was proscribed by the Constitution.47 In any
event, the next year the Court upheld key portions of the Social
Security Act in the paired cases of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis48
and Helvering v. Davis,49 emphatically reaffirming its adherence
to the Hamiltonian view. Since then, the Court has not wavered
Id. at 26-35; Renz, supra note 24, at 97-99.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 90720 at 662-72 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1994) (1833).
41 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It
seems to me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding [of good policy about anything] by all the means at its command.”).
42 See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 192-95 (1921) (Hughes
position is set forth in his argument for appellees before the Court).
43 See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 474-79 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. ed. 1993) (1928).
44 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
45 Id. at 54-55.
46 Id. at 66.
47 Id. at 77-78. This conclusion drew a dissent from three of the justices. The dissenters agreed, however, that the Hamiltonian interpretation of the spending clause was the
correct one. Id. at 80-81 (Stone, J., dissenting).
48 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
49 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
39
40

R
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on the issue—although it has been criticized in specific cases for
misapplying the clause. 50 Indeed, judicial fealty to the
Hamiltonian interpretation is so complete that one commentator
recently claimed that, “No one today candidly denies that Hamilton’s view of the spending power was correct.”51
With this victory for the general Hamiltonian interpretation
of the power, the main issue for both courts and commentators
became the extent to which Congress could condition the receipt of
federal funds on the recipient’s willingness to conform to certain
behavior dictated by Congress.52 Even those adhering to a most
restrictive view of the spending power must agree that Congress
may, when spending to effect an enumerated power, impose corresponding regulations which are necessary to assure that the
money is spent to address its goal. Failure to impose such conditions would arguably leave the spending vulnerable to constitutional challenge under a Madisonian view of the power, as it
would effectively allow the federal government to spend in ways
that do not support its enumerated powers.53 It would seem
equally uncontroverted that Congress, as a condition of granting
funds pursuant to one enumerated power, may impose conditions
that could have been enacted or imposed pursuant to another enumerated power.54 More difficult questions arise when Congress attempts to condition funds on the recipients’ agreement to engage,
or not to engage, in behavior otherwise beyond the enumerated
federal powers,55 or to condition the grant of funds on the recipients’ agreement to forego a constitutional right.56 An effort to address the latter situation has been made, in part, through the
slow, difficult development of the complex doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.57 However, while this doctrine has restricted
50 See, e.g., Engdahl, The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 36-37 (criticizing the Butler court for a self-contradictory opinion); See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1500-06.
51 Engdahl, The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 5. But see John Eastman, Restoring
the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001).
52 This issue had been bubbling even before the decision in Butler and the Social Security Act cases. Under the Maternity Act of 1921, the federal government sought to provide funds to states that adopted certain plans for promoting maternal and infant welfare,
an area of activity traditionally reserved to the states and certainly beyond any enumerated power of Congress. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Supreme
Court dodged a substantive challenge to this conditional spending by dismissing the case
for lack of standing.
53 This point is succinctly made in Justice Stone’s Butler dissent: “Expenditures would
fail of their purpose and thus lose their constitutional sanction if the terms of payment
were not such that by their influence on the action of the recipients the permitted end
would be attained.” United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 83 (Stone, J., dissenting).
54 Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1126.
55 Id. at 1127.
56 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1415.
57 Id. at 1416 (“Just when the doctrine appears secure, new decisions arise to explode
it.”).
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government regulatory power in limited circumstances,58 it has
been a minimal check on government power, especially where federal regulation through conditions on spending is concerned.59
A second result of the triumph of Hamiltonianism, more important for purposes of this paper, has been the constitutional
legitimization of a vast amount of federal spending, often conditioned on the acceptance of regulation otherwise beyond Congress’s enumerated powers. This spending has changed the
fundamental relationship between the government and the people, and in turn, the fundamental nature of American politics and
representation.
As is usually the case when legal doctrines shift, the timing of
the Butler, Helvering, and Steward Machine cases, solidifying the
hold of the Hamiltonian view of the Spending Clause, is not pure
chance. The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in
1913, authorized the federal government to directly tax income,
creating a vast new source of revenue for the government. That
same year, passage of the Seventeenth Amendment provided for
the direct election of Senators, who had formerly been chosen by
state legislatures. The effect of the Seventeenth Amendment was
to strip from the states one of their primary weapons to fight federal encroachment on state power. United States Senators, suddenly able to appeal directly to popular passions when seeking reelection, rather than to state officials jealously guarding their own
power, were no longer a bulwark of states’ rights against the federal leviathan. Finally, a changing intellectual climate in the
United States created a growing demand for federal involvement
in areas traditionally reserved to the states. In such a climate, it is
clear, in hindsight at least, that something had to give.
The Spending Clause decisions of the late 1930’s were merely
part of an enormous change in the relationship between the federal government, the states, and the people at large. The Spending Clause cases were decided more or less simultaneously with a
line of cases greatly expanding Congress’s regulatory power under
the Commerce Clause60 and eroding constitutional protections
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.61 In 1938, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Carolene Products Company,62 upholding against due process
challenges a piece of egregiously transparent special interest legislation that sought to benefit the dairy industry by driving proSee, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending, supra note 14, at 1929-32.
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
58
59
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ducers of a competing, legal, non-dairy product out of the market
on the phoniest of pretexts.63 The Carolene Products decision
“freed the forces of interest group politics from the stumbling
block of the federal courts,”64 and suggested that there would be no
due process limits to Congress’s ability to regulate in the economic
sphere.65
Before the decisions in Butler, Helvering, Steward Machine
Co., Wickard v. Filburn, and Carolene Products, one could conceive of the federal government’s powers as modest islands, surrounded by a vast sea of rights belonging to the states or to the
people.66 After these decisions, the balance of power changed: indeed, the doctrines of unconstitutional conditions in the realm of
the Spending Clause, and of “strict scrutiny” over legislation affecting the rights of “discrete and insular minorities,” in the realm
of due process,67 can largely be seen as efforts to shore up small
islands of personal liberties now awash in a sea of federal power.
In sum, by vastly expanding the regulatory power of the federal
government, the judicial revolution of the 1930’s opened up unprecedented opportunities for rent-seeking by business, labor, and
other interests, especially in the economic sphere.68 The triumph
of the Hamiltonian interpretation of the Spending Clause was a
part of this revolution.
III.

THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE CONNECTION

A. The Evil to be Addressed
The threat to civil liberties caused by the demise of the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, and substantive due process
as significant limits on government power may have been held at
bay by the doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and strict scrutiny for civil liberties.69 However, proponents of activist government have had an even more difficult time creating legal
standards that harness the special interest rent-seeking unleashed by these convergent trends.
397.

63

See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV.

Id. at 399.
Id.
Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States . . . are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
67 The actual language of Carolene Products calls not for “strict” scrutiny but for
“more exacting” scrutiny. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The Court first
adopted the phrase “strict scrutiny” in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
68 This paper deals with the problem on a federal level. It should be clear, however,
that the rent-seeking problems discussed here also exist at the state level, where checks on
government power have been equally eroded.
69 I am by no means certain that this is true.
64
65
66
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Rent-seeking by special interests was not, of course, unknown
before the New Deal. Indeed, the effort to protect society from
rent-seeking was at the heart of many elements of the Constitution. In promoting the American Revolution, the founders had
eradicated, in America at least, the notion that government was
merely an extension of the private authority of the monarchy.
Rather, public and private interests were recognized as separate
realms.70 However, if government policy was not merely to be an
extension of the interests of the governed, the founders needed
something to replace the monarchy as a source of law and policy
above politics and free from the power and pressure of markets. At
the time of the Revolution, the nation’s founders looked to civic
virtue and self-sacrifice to promote the public good, and believed
that these attributes were promoted by the very existence of republican government.71 However, by the time the Constitutional
Convention convened in Philadelphia, the men sitting down to
write that constitution had become jaded. By then, it seemed plain
that civic virtue alone was insufficient to assure the public good
against the power of special interests. The writing of a new constitution became, to a substantial extent, an effort to recognize these
interests and to put them to use for the public good.72
Hamilton understood the difficulty of separating public policy
from factional private interest. He was very concerned with finding disinterested men of virtue to give order to public affairs.
Though himself a “self-made” man without the leisure of so many
of the founders, Hamilton saw a need for legislators to be free
from the pressure of markets. He was fearful that legislatures
would be dominated by merchants, looking after their parochial
interests, and the landed class looking after theirs.73 Hamilton’s
only real solution to this problem, put forth in Federalist No. 35,
was to rely on members of the “learned professions,” particularly
lawyers, whom Hamilton thought formed “no distinct interest,”
and would be the “impartial arbiter” between the “different
branches of industry.”74 In addition, Hamilton expressed remarkable confidence in the voters to choose such wise and disinterested
men for the legislature.75 Hamilton, simply put, was better at seeing the potential benefits of the new government, than at finding
ways to guard against its potential dangers.
70 See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
187-89 (1992); DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 6972 (1994).
71 See WOOD, supra note 70, at 190, 252-53.
72 Id. at 253.
73 THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 214-16 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
74 Id. at 215-16. Not surprisingly, Hamilton was a member of the learned professions.
75 Id. at 216-17.
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That was not the case with Madison. Whereas Hamilton saw
the benefits the nation could reap from the new Constitution, and
envisioned the United States as a dynamic, thriving nation of
great wealth and power,76 Madison focused his attention on the
potential problems the new Constitution might create.
Madison’s best work in the Federalist Papers is, to a significant extent, an acknowledgment of the inevitable existence of private interests and an effort to show how a government might be
structured so that it would be likely to protect the public good
from domination by private interests. Federalist No. 10, of course,
most frankly acknowledges the tendency toward “faction,” as
Madison called it. Madison argued that the causes of faction could
not be controlled, at least not without “destroying the liberty
which is essential to its existence,”77 but that the worst effects of
faction could be ameliorated in two ways. The first is through representative government, rather than direct democracy.78 The second is through the size of the legislative body—neither too large
nor too small.79 The separation of powers between the states and
the federal government is essential for this second feature:
By enlarging too much the number of electors [relative to the
number of representatives], you render the representative too
little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser
interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly
attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue
great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a
happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, and local and particular to
the State legislatures.80

In Federalist No. 56, Madison responded to the concern that
the U.S. House would be too small for members to have adequate
knowledge of local affairs by arguing first, that the role of the federal government would be modest and deal with issues for which
little particularized local knowledge would be necessary;81 and second, that at one member for approximately each 30,000 citizens,
the ratio of citizens to members would be sufficiently low.82
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 72-78 (1997).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 at 343-44 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 at 346-50 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
81 THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 346-48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
82 Id. at 348-350. From the U.S. Census 2000 statistics, I estimate that our 435 congressmen each now represent approximately 655,702 constituents, which is twenty-one
times the number of constituents in Madison’s day. U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico: Census 2000, Table 2 (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/respop.html>.
76
77
78
79
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In Federalist No. 51, Madison argued that the principles of
federalism would put private interests to work as a bulwark
against overreaching government: “[T]he society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the
rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger
. . . .”83 Elsewhere, Madison argued that the separation of powers
within the federal government would help to prevent any particular interest from capturing the government.84 Finally, as we have
already seen,85 the principle of enumerated powers would prevent
the federal government from overpowering the states—so much
so, in fact, that Madison—and Hamilton too—argued that the
states would hold the upper hand against the national government.86 It was hoped that, through such a carefully structured division of power, the federal government could remain free of
special interest dominance, and would, indeed, play the role of the
“disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions and interests in the State.”87
It is an oversimplification, but perhaps a helpful one, to describe Madison’s theory as follows. First, factions are an inevitable
result of freedom, and efforts to extinguish them are worse than
the problems they cause; thus, a major goal of the Constitution
was to structure the government in such a way as to control the
worst ills of faction, and to give elected officials incentives and a
framework to act for the common good. This task could be aided by
the large geographic jurisdiction of the proposed federal government, which would cause it to “take in a greater variety of parties
and interests[,]”88 and promote higher quality representation at
the federal level. Finally, by strictly limiting the powers of that
federal government, so that it would concern itself only with matters of “great and aggregate interests,”89 factions would be limited
to the minor squabbles of local matters and state government,
where intimate knowledge of particular local conditions was most
necessary in any case. Where the Spending Clause was concerned,
that meant that Congress would be largely restricted to appropriating money for the purposes of carrying out powers otherwise
enumerated in the Constitution. Or such was the Madisonian
case, in a nutshell.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
85 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 at 196-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87 Letter from Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in WOOD, supra note 70,
at 253.
88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
89 Id.
83
84
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For the better part of a century, the Madisonian approach
largely held sway. For example, although Justice Story argued
early on that Congress had never limited appropriations to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution, spending for nonenumerated purposes appears to have been the exception rather
than the rule.90 During all this time, the government remained
small, the opportunities for rent-seeking limited, and campaign finance regulation non-existent.
By the end of the nineteenth century, this period of strictly
limited government was reaching its end. Beginning with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1881, Congress
and the states increasingly took steps to regulate railroad rates,
business practices, and working conditions.91 By 1913, demand for
federal action on a variety of fronts led to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment and the income tax, providing the federal government with an enormous source of new revenue, as was soon
made apparent during the First World War.92 As government
spending and regulation expanded, interested money began to
flow into the political system, and calls for campaign finance regulation became common for the first time.93 Rapid growth in campaign spending, and major campaign finance reform initiatives
have ever since followed close behind periods of increased government activism. The first federal acts regulating campaign finance
were passed during the “Progressive” era between the turn of the
century and World War I. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act was
passed during the otherwise quiet 1920’s in response to the Teapot
Dome scandal, but it was the explosion in government spending
during the New Deal of the 1930’s that led to campaign finance
measures being passed in 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1947.94 A third
wave of campaign finance regulation passed in the 1970’s,95 following the initiation of President Johnson’s “Great Society” programs.
It was at that time that the creation of Common Cause, Public
Citizen, and other groups created a permanent presence to lobby
for campaign finance regulation. Meanwhile, the level of govern90 See Engdahl, The Spending Power, supra note 8, at 26-33, for a description of many
such exceptions.
91 See, e.g., STUART CHASE, GOVERNMENT IN BUSINESS 25 (1936).
92 Income tax rates rose from an initial seven percent on incomes over $500,000 in
1913 to top rates of over 75% during World War I. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 638-39 (1997).
93 See generally BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 21-38 (2001) (for a discussion of the progression of regulation of political
finance) [hereinafter SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH]; GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY
TREE 30-62 (1973) (for a discussion of the sources of campaign cash).
94 Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: The General Landscape: The Sirens’
Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 22-23
(1997) [hereinafter Smith, Sirens’ Song].
95 Id. at 23-26.
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ment spending rose inexorably, under both Republican and Democratic presidents and Congresses, to its present level of nearly
$2.8 trillion per year,96 while campaign spending accelerated at
rates far greater than inflation, easily exceeding two billion dollars in federal races in the elections of 2000.97
The correlation between the growth of government spending
and the demand for campaign finance regulation is no coincidence.
Higher government spending increases opportunities for private
rent-seeking from the government. These opportunities trigger
more spending on campaigns as interested parties seek to take
advantage of these available rents. The result is a cause and effect
relationship by which the growth rate of government spending accounts for eighty percent or more of the growth rate in campaign
spending.98
Advocates of campaign finance regulation generally argue
that large campaign contributions hinder legislative efforts to
reach the common good in three ways.99 The most often heard argument is that it leads to quid pro quo corruption in a form not far
removed from bribery:100 the overt exchanges of legislative votes
for campaign contributions. This seems to be what the Supreme
Court had in mind when it upheld limits on contributions to candidates in Buckley v. Valeo.101 Here the frustration of the public good
is obvious—legislators vote to please the particular interests of
contributors rather than voting for the good of all. Legislators may
continue to debate issues, but the debates will be aimed less at
96 BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, Government Current Receipts and Expenditures
(visited Feb. 19, 2001) <http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableViewFixed.asp?SelectedTable=37&FirstYear=1999&LastYear=2000&Freq=Qtr>.
97 See Center for Responsible Politics (visited Feb. 20, 2001) <http://www.opensecrets.
org> (showing total expenditures of approximately $1.1 billion by Federal Republican and
Democratic Party committees, (visited Feb. 20, 2001) <http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/
total.asp?Cmte=rpC>, (visited Feb. 20, 2001) <http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/total.
asp?Cmte=dpC>; $344 million in spending by presidential campaigns, (visited March 3,
2001) <http://www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/index/AllCands.htm>; $555 million by House
candidates, and $437 million by Senate candidates, (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.
opensecrets.org/2000elect/storysofar/index.asp?display=totals>. These amounts do not include spending on internal communications to members of unions and other advocacy and
member groups, amounts spent on issue advertising by such groups during the period of
the campaign, or amounts spent by presidential candidates defeated in the primaries). Reports may be accessed through (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.fec.gov>.
98 John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger, 43 J.L. & ECON. 359, 383 (2000) (attributing
87% of the rise in federal campaign expenditures to increased government spending) [hereinafter Lott, Jr., Simple Explanation]; see also FILIP PALDA, HOW MUCH IS YOUR VOTE
WORTH? 96 (1994) (noting near one-to-one correlation in growth percentages between that
of campaign spending and that of government expenditures).
99 The discussion that follows owes much to Daniel Ortiz’s analysis, although I ultimately do not break down the interests in quite the way he does. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 897-901 (1998).
100 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985).
101 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
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determining any common good than at justifying positions pre-determined by contributions.102
A second way in which campaign contributions might frustrate legislation for the common good is by distracting legislators
from the pursuit of that good. That is to say, legislators may be
required to spend so much time raising money that they shirk
their more important legislative duties,103 in particular that of
reasoned debate. The Madisonian view of politics, like that of Edmund Burke, holds that the careful thought and deliberation of
elected representatives is an essential part of “refining” public
views in a way that helps to determine the public good.104 If legislators feel compelled to ignore this duty in order to engage in fund
raising, the public good may suffer.105
Third, limitations on campaign giving and spending may be
necessary to enhance debate not just among the legislators, but
also among the public. This is the “drowning out” theory. It holds,
first, that inequalities among speakers will mean that certain
views are not heard, simply because they are “drowned out” by
better financed views.106 Second, it holds that what the voters will
hear may not be what they ought to hear. That is, reformers suggest that the mass marketing of political ideas through costly but
brief and simplified television ads may hinder, rather than help
informed decision making by the public;107 better, they seem to
think, that voters should be forced to wade through long leaflets
and attend candidate forum nights. Though not a Madisonian argument per se, this argument has echoes of Madison’s concern
that “[t]he influence of factious leaders” might lead voters to support measures that were against their best, long-term interest.108
102 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392 (1994).
103 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1281 (1994).
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in REPRESENTATION 157, 17476 (Hanna Fenichel Pitken ed., 1969).
105 This line of thought might be viewed as a modern twist on another belief common to
the men who shaped the Constitution, including both Madison and Hamilton: that good
legislators would be men of “leisure and easy circumstances,” liberally educated, with time
to consider and debate the affairs of government—in other words, an American aristocracy.
See WOOD, supra note 70, at 253-55; Saul Cornell, Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of
Backcountry Anti-Federalism, 76 J. AM. HIST. 1148, 1162 (1989).
106 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1408-10 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech]; J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1018-20 (1976). I have sharply criticized both
the theoretical and empirical validity of this view in Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks:
Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 69-72 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Money Talks].
107 Wright, supra note 106, at 1012.
108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Based on these concerns,109 the campaign finance regulators
seek to put into place structural safeguards that will assure wise
political decision-making. The goal, as it was with Madison and
the founders, is to structure government in such a way that legislators will reach decisions in the public good, rather than in the
interest of one faction or another.110
Each of the regulators’ theories can be criticized on its own
terms. For example, there is precious little in the way of systematic evidence to suggest that campaign contributions are the
source of significant quid pro quo corruption,111 and strong theoretical reasons to doubt that such quid pro quo corruption is the
serious problem portrayed by reformers.112 Similarly, there is no
particular reason to think that, freed from fund-raising responsibilities, officeholders would not simply enjoy more leisure time. Finally, a growing body of literature shows that voter knowledge,
including voters’ ability to identify candidates, their party affiliation, their stands on issues, and their general place on the ideological spectrum, benefits substantially from mass political
109 A fourth concern is that of political equality. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Supreme
Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789 (1998); Sunstein,
supra note 102; Ortiz, supra note 99, at 899-901. As the size of government grows, and
opportunity for rent-seeking increases, inequality in the ability to capture rents becomes a
greater perceived problem. Cf. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM L. REV. 1369 (1994) [hereinafter Strauss, Corruption]. I have not
devoted space to this argument in this text because it does not address the type of “good
government” arguments—the search for a world above interest group politics—at issue
here. I have discussed equality concerns at length in other writings, including Bradley A.
Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
612-16 [hereinafter Smith, Some Problems] and especially Smith, Money Talks supra note
105, at 63-97.
110 Ortiz, supra note 99, at 897-901. Of course, another possible goal may be merely to
silence political opposition so as to enhance one’s own rent-seeking opportunities or the
opportunity to enact one’s own policy preferences. I assume, however, that most proponents
of regulation argue in good faith.
111 See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1067-71 (1996) [hereinafter Smith, Faulty
Assumptions]. Typical of the research showing that campaign contributions have little effect on legislative behavior, and that most donors give to candidates who agree with their
positions prior to taking office, is John R. Lott, Jr. & Stephen G. Bronars, Time Series
Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives, 76 PUB. CHOICE 125 (1993).
112 Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 111 at 1067-71; See also SMITH, UNFREE
SPEECH, supra note 93, at 126-31; Smith, Some Problems, supra note 108, at 616-24. Readers interested in a far more sophisticated debate than can be laid out here may want to
review the following articles from the 1995 University of Chicago Legal Forum: Bruce E.
Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111;
David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
141; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on
Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163 [hereinafter Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption]; see also Professor Lowenstein’s earlier article, Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 301 (1989) [hereinafter Lowenstein, The Root of All Evil], for an excellent work at
developing a much more sophisticated model of “corruption” than the simplistic quid pro
quo model that the Supreme Court seemed to have in mind in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), and that is portrayed in much popular and some academic literature.
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advertising.113 These disputes are, for the most part, fights over
empirical matters for which conclusive data is simply not available. Assuming there is some validity to the complaints raised by
the reform community, the real question is whether the regulatory
community is moving down the right path.
B. Heirs to Madison?
In certain respects, the proponents of campaign finance regulation in the late twentieth century can claim to be the rightful
heirs to the Madisonian tradition. Like Madison, they seek to promote a government dedicated to the public good in a world dominated by private interests. Like Madison and the other framers of
the Constitution, they do not believe that the natural interplay of
private interests in the political system will inexorably lead to the
public good.114
In their distaste for “special interests,” and their tendency to
equate virtually all private campaigning and lobbying as “corrupt,”115 modern reformers also harken back to a pre-constitutional notion of disinterested, enlightened leadership. Under this
model of representation, with which the younger Madison was
much taken, legislators themselves had no particular interests to
advance or cause to defend, other than the “common good.”116 Yet
by the time the Constitution was written, Madison and other leaders were already much jaded by experience, and this concept of
representation was under attack. Anti-federalist writers argued
that the gentry, hiding behind the veil of disinterestedness, were
in fact as interested as was anyone else. They too benefited or lost
personally through various government policies. This vested interest was not necessarily a bad thing, indeed the anti-federalists
saw it as a good thing, so long as it was recognized that the gentry
were an interested cabal like any other group in society.117
Much of the same debate goes on today with the campaign
reform lobby. For example, in the elections of 1998, the reform
group Campaign for America, which seeks to ban all “soft money”
ads, nevertheless ran their own “soft money” ads in Kentucky.118
113 See, e.g., John J. Coleman & Paul F. Manna, Congressional Campaign Spending
and the Quality of Democracy, 62 J. POL. 757 (2000).
114 See WOOD, supra note 70, at 253.
115 See SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH, supra note 93, at 10-11.
116 See Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
IDENTITY 69 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
117 See generally id.; see also WOOD, supra note 70, at 255-60; Letter from the Federal
Farmer (Jan. 20, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 79 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985); Letter
from Brutus “To the Citizens of the State of New York” (Nov. 15, 1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 122, 125-26 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
118 Edward Zuckerman, Reformer Spent $466,029 to Fix Kentucky Senate Race, POL.
FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov. 11, 1998, at 1, 4.
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Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan, though sympathetic to reform goals, have noted that most scholarly arguments for regulation would have the predictable effect of giving greater political
power to scholars and intellectuals, while reducing the power of
business owners and others.119 The press, which has ardently supported campaign finance regulation, also faces conflicts of interest, as its political power is enhanced by limits on private
contributions and spending for political communication.120
Even if Madison might still search for disinterested leadership, there remains the question of how to assure it through the
structure of government. One might quarrel over whether the
Constitution, and in particular the First Amendment, in fact protects campaign giving and spending.121 But in at least two important ways, efforts to regulate campaign finance are directly at
odds with the Madisonian approach to the Constitution. First,
whereas Madison sought to create a government structure that
would protect individual freedoms as an integral part of any public good, modern campaign finance “reformers” seek to limit individual freedoms in order to produce a government structure that
will yield a common good.122 Campaign finance regulation does not
seek to change the structure of government at all, or even the way
in which citizens cast votes. Rather, it seeks to change the way in
which people discuss issues of government and politics. It seeks to
do this through rather straightforward restrictions on the right to
speak and participate in politics. Campaign finance regulation
turns out not to be a structural approach to government at all, but
a policy approach in which the government directly invokes its police power in order to regulate the human conduct at issue. The
modern campaign finance reform movement seeks to achieve its
goals by, “destroying the liberty which is essential to [faction’s]
existence.”123 In this respect, it has far more in common with the
Alien and Sedition Acts than with any Madisonian approach to
government.124
119 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1731 (1999).
120 See Arthur N. Eisenberg, Buckley, Rupert Murdoch, and the Pursuit of Equality in
the Conduct of Elections, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 451, 459-60 (1996).
121 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 410-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122 See, e.g., E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in “Faulty Assumptions”: A
Response to Professor Smith’s Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV.
867, 895-96 (1998); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First
Amendment, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1055 (1999); Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 106; Wright,
supra note 106.
123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
124 The notorious Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 constituted, among other things, an
attempt to make criminal any “false, scandalous and malicious writing” against the government. For a full account of these acts, their passage, and ultimate failure, see JAMES MOR-
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Second, the modern approach to reform also differs from the
constitution making of 1787 in that it seeks to narrow the range of
voices, rather than to increase them. Madison argued that the way
to alleviate the effects of faction was to “take in a greater variety
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority
of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it . . . to act in unison”125 Campaign finance
reformers, on the other hand, seek to silence voices. Their argument, that by silencing some they will enhance the voices of
others,126 is almost certainly wrong,127 and frequently appears to
be motivated by bias against the substantive arguments of those
they would silence.128 By silencing one source of potential influence, they seek to boost the power of other interests, which they
have determined are underrepresented. In fact, by narrowing the
number of players and driving out one of the most fluid sources of
political power, they actually entrench a small elite of incumbents,
staff, lobbyists, journalists, consultants, celebrities, and
lawyers.129
C. Heirs to Hamilton?
When Jefferson criticized Madison’s proposal to begin a survey for possible post roads, it was not the knee-jerk reaction of a
hopelessly out of touch theorist who was not aware of the highly
plausible constitutional sanction for the undertaking. Rather,
what Jefferson intuitively realized was that once the structural
limits on the federal spending power were ignored, or interpreted
to give the federal government broad powers in the domestic
sphere, the lid would come off: “[I]t will be a scene of eternal
scramble among the members who can get the most money”130
SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1956).
125 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
126 See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 106, at 1414-15; Edward B. Foley, EqualDollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1204, 1227-28 (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 84-85, 236-39 (1993).
127 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225-53 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds.,
1992); John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 122-23 (1996).
128 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 939, 945 (1985); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A
Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045,
1061 (1985) [hereinafter BeVier, Money]. I discuss the substantive biases of many prominent reform scholars at some length in SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH, supra note 93, at 120-21,
146-47, 162 & accompanying notes.
129 See SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH, supra note 93, at 201-13.
130 See Letter from Jefferson to Madison (March 6, 1796), in 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826,
at 923 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
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Thus, even where spending appeared to be in support of a specifically enumerated federal power, Jefferson felt that the spending
power should be construed narrowly. In the case of the post roads,
Madison hastened to reassure his friend that his proposal was
“limited to the choice of roads where that is presented, and to the
opening them, in other cases, so far only as may be necessary for
the transportation of the mail.”131 Local governments, he added,
would maintain and improve any roads opened by the federal
government.132
For the most part, those leading the effort to regulate campaign finance have rejected Jefferson’s fundamental insight into
the nature of federal spending. There are, and have been, to be
sure, supporters of limited government, by which I mean a much
smaller government role than currently exists in the United
States, who have favored restrictions on campaign giving and
spending. Barry Goldwater may be the most notable among
them.133 But for the most part, campaign finance regulation in the
United States has drawn its support from those who generally
favor active government, an expansive interpretation of the
Spending and Commerce Clauses, and in particular, high levels of
federal spending.134
It appears, however, that Jefferson and Madison were correct.
Under both Republicans and Democrats, government spending
goes up. Agencies are captured by the interests they are intended
to regulate. Citizens, in increasing numbers, perceive their government to be run for the benefit of special interests.135
The quest to limit campaign speech is a case of Hamiltonianism at wits end. Having broken down the Constitution’s structural
restraints on federal spending, and seen the federal treasury fueled with direct taxes on income, these modern Hamiltonians find
themselves in search of something with which to replace the discipline of a strictly construed Spending Clause.
131 Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Apr. 4, 1796), in 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at
929 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
132 Id.
133 See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1128-29 (1994).
134 Lott, Jr., Simple Explanation, supra note 98, at 385.
135 See, e.g., Rasmussen Research Poll, Americans Say Government Does Not Reflect
Will of the People, (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.portraitofamerica.com/html/poll58.html> (finding that by 46% to 40% respondents felt that “government [does not] accurately reflect the will of the [American] people”); Gallup Poll, Gallup Poll Surveys—Gallup
Poll News Service—October 6-9, 2000 (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/
surveys/2000/topline001006/q25t28.asp> (finding 63% agreed with statement, “no matter
what new laws are passed, special interests will always find a way to maintain their power
in Washington.”).

R

\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP105.txt

140

unknown

Chapman Law Review

Seq: 24

23-APR-01

10:43

[Vol. 4:117

So far, however, the effort to replace constitutional discipline
on the government with statutory speech prohibitions on the citizenry has failed in a manner that should be increasingly apparent
to even the casual observer. Few believe that presidential elections, which are funded by the government, are better than senatorial elections, which are not. Few would argue that politics in
New York, which bans corporate contributions, are more guided
by concern for the public interest than politics in Virginia, where
such contributions are legal. Since the passage of the 1974
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act,136 campaign
finance has been more heavily regulated in the United States than
ever before. Yet, there is little sense that the effort has been successful at curbing special interest influence. Of course, these issues are far more complex and multi-faceted than these few
rhetorical comments might suggest. I resort to this rhetorical
technique precisely because a thorough discussion is far beyond
the scope of this paper, and even a thorough citation to the literature would take several pages.137 However, I do want to suggest
that, though the issue is complicated, on the mere face of things
there is little reason to think that campaign finance regulation
has been, or will be, successful on its own terms. Nor can this failure be blamed entirely, or even primarily, on the courts, which
have admittedly struck down much campaign finance regulation
as unconstitutional.138
Though the courts have cut wide swaths through campaign
finance regulation, it is not fair to blame the courts for the failure
of the enterprise. The cases, though perhaps controversial, are
well-grounded in precedent.139 Furthermore, a growing number of
reform-minded advocates and scholars are themselves showing an
2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 455 (2000); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9042 (2000).
See Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 111, at 1071-91, where I have discussed
the failure of campaign finance laws at some length. See BeVier, Money, supra note 128;
Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 213 (1989); and Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political
Speech, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 1, for a few of the best articles arguing that efforts have failed.
More sympathetic treatment of reform failures can be found in Cain, supra note 112;
Strauss, Corruption, supra note 109; Sunstein, supra note 102; Levinson, supra note 128.
There is virtually no literature arguing that campaign finance regulation has been successful, although there is a great deal arguing that it could be, if done right. See Lowenstein,
The Root of All Evil, supra note 112; Kenneth R. Mayer, Public Financing and Electoral
Competition in Minnesota and Wisconsin (1998); MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS,
THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN
STATES (1998), for a few of the better pieces.
138 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). These are the most notable
cases in this regard at the Supreme Court level.
139 See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J.L. &
POL’Y 93 (1997); L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 243; Polsby, supra note 137.
136
137
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understanding, not always present in their predecessors, that the
problem may be impossible to solve short of the most radical constitutional surgery, if then. For some, the result is skepticism,
coupled with a patient if sometimes pessimistic search for answers
within present constitutional norms.140 For others, the call is for
far more radical surgery,141 including, in some cases, government
regulation of the press and strict limits on the amount and/or type
of political speech by individuals.142
What is perhaps ironic is that even if these most radical solutions were adopted, the core dilemmas of campaign finance,
caused by the problem of rent-seeking, would remain.143 The desire to seek rents would still lead to efforts to influence candidates
and campaigns. Indeed, many of those efforts would be moved underground, or take other forms less visible to the public. For example, payments might be made under the table, or through straw
donors. Certain individuals would still exercise “undue” influence
through media access or ownership, or through communications to
groups with large memberships. Other groups would retain influence through their size and ability to lobby.144 It is extremely difficult to see how such rent-seeking techniques could be regulated.145
In fact, one of the great ironies of the debate over campaign
finance reform is that reform is posited as a necessity to prevent
special interest rent-seeking, yet the reform effort itself has become a major source of rent-seeking.146 Efforts to pass reform have
been stymied as groups attempt to shape such bills in ways that
will strengthen their legislative and electoral influence relative to
140 See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 119; Oritz, supra note 99; Lowenstein,
Campaign Contributions and Corruption, supra note 112.
141 See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (1993) (calling for mandatory debates, free air time and personal
subsidies for candidates, public funding of campaigns, increased reporting requirements,
low spending limits, and contribution limits of $20 or less); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791-92 (1987) (arguing that the state should subsidize viewpoints
which are not adequately represented in public discourse).
142 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1996); Foley, supra note 126. See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., The President’s Least-Favorite
Nominee, February 26, 2000 NAT’L J. available in 2000 WL 6436855 (quoting U.S. Senator
John McCain on his desire to ban all “negative” ads; and former Senator and presidential
candidate Bill Bradley on his proposal to place a 100% tax on all issue-oriented political
speech).
143 See Smith, Sirens’ Song, supra note 94, at 26-41; see also Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258
(1994); Fried, supra note 127.
144 See Charles E. M. Kolb & Christopher Dreibelbis, Campaign Finance Reform: A
Business Perspective, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 87 (2000).
145 See Smith, Sirens’ Song, supra note 94, at 35-41; Lott, Jr., Simple Explanation,
supra note 98, at 362.
146 See, e.g., Lowenstein, The Root of All Evil, supra note 112 at 309-10.
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that of their competitors.147 Meanwhile, advocates of reform in the
current Congress have been touting it to Republicans on the very
much self-interested grounds that it will benefit Republicans and
incumbents at the polls,148 which would seem to be the exact opposite of any pitch to the “public good.”
IV.

CONCLUSION

The triumph of the Hamiltonian view of the Spending Clause
has created extensive opportunities for private rent-seeking from
government appropriations. Although it is not at all clear that
campaign donations play anything more than a trivial part in this
rent-seeking,149 the push to regulate campaign contributions and
spending is an effort to bring rent-seeking under control. As a
structural impediment to rent-seeking, it bears some resemblance
to the type of Madisonian designs placed in the Constitution,
aimed at creating a legislature that would place the common good
ahead of private interests. However, unlike true Madisonian devices, it attempts to perform its magic by restraining private liberty, rather than by creating a structure for government that
minimizes the tendencies of citizens to seek rents and government
to grant them. The enterprise fails because it attacks a symptom,
rather than the cause, of the problem.
Many of the most ardent advocates of campaign finance regulation support the expansive view of the Spending Clause that creates so much incentive for rent-seeking. This is not as odd as it
may seem. Their desire for active government creates a corresponding need for something to serve as a check on rent-seeking.
Their preference for active government makes them more willing
to accept the loss of political freedom inherent in their campaign
finance regulation proposals. The problem is that little short of
the most draconian regulatory measures are likely to succeed, and
even those are probably destined to fail. In other words, high
levels of government spending and rent-seeking go together. Campaign regulation has been shown to shift the form of the rent-seeking, but not to reduce its presence. The events culminating in the
Butler, Helvering, Steward Machine Co., and Carolene Products
147 SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH, supra note 93, at 93-94; see also Kolb & Dreibelbis, supra
note 144, at 108 (arguing, in support of regulation, that big business will not be harmed
due to its superior lobbying ability).
148 See, e.g., Peter H. Stone, Soft Money and the Senate, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 7, 2001
at 1M (quoting Trevor Potter and Joshua Rosenkranz).
149 See, e.g., GREGORY WAWRO, LEGISLATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2000); Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose, Corporate
PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUS. & POL. 75 (2000); Stephen G. Bronars
& John R. Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors
Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?, 40 J.L. & ECON. 317
(1997).
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cases effectively removed most constitutional restraints on government power and unleashed the forces of rent-seeking in a war
of all against all.
The campaign finance regulators, in a futile effort to prevent
this rent-seeking, would now have us sacrifice our political liberty
as well. Reform efforts have sought to impose a truce in that war
by banning or limiting one form of weaponry—campaign money.
However, such a truce can only be truly obtained when interests
agree to quit trying to pillage one another through the power of
government—or at least when government is placed under such
restraints that it cannot fulfill the rent-seekers’ aims.
Fortunately, it appears that the American people are willing
to tolerate some level of rent-seeking, at least if the alternative is
the type of campaign regulation commonly proposed by regulators.
Polls consistently show that campaign finance reform remains a
very low priority with voters,150 in part because voters may be
more realistic than the reformers. Polls also show that voters have
little confidence in more regulation leading to a reduction in
corruption.151
But if Hamilton is at wits’ end, so is Madison. For there seems
to be little popular support in the United States for reinvigorating
checks on the spending power, such as a strict construction of the
general welfare phrase or the enumerated powers of Article I. A
recent Rasmussen Research survey asked poll respondents:
3. The Constitution gave limited powers to the federal government. Sometimes, Congress passes laws that are not authorized
by the Constitution. For example, there is no authority in the
Constitution for the federal government to pay for 100,000 additional teachers in local school systems.
In a case like this, is it better for Congress to follow the Constitution or is it better for Congress to pay for 100,000 additional
teachers?152

Despite the loaded question, which presumed the Madisonian position and presented it as fact to respondents, 51 percent preferred
that Congress hire the teachers, with just 36 percent urging Con150 For a summary of earlier data, see Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause:
Some Thoughts on Campaign Reform and a Response to Professor Paul, 30 CONN. L. REV.
831, 833-36 (1998).
151 Rasmussen Research Poll, Portrait of America: Americans say Campaign Spending
Limits will NOT Clean Up Politics (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.portraitofamerica.
com/html/poll-266.html> (80% thought more laws would not reduce special interest influence); see also Rasmussen Research Poll, Rush Limbaugh is a Reg Flag for Many
Americans; They’d Rather Have Rather (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.portraitofamerica.com/html/poll-696.html> (found by a nearly 27% to 14% margin voters
would support a candidate who opposed new campaign finance laws in favor of enforcing
existing laws, with the large plurality considering it one of many issues).
152 Rasmussen Research Poll, 51% Would Vote for Constitution Today (visited March 3,
2001) <http://www.portraitofamerica.com/html/poll-1066.html>.
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gress to follow the Constitution.153 This is all the more remarkable
given that the issue (hiring a relatively small number of teachers
through federal taxation rather than local taxes), though clearly
important to voters, hardly seems a matter of immediate and
great national concern. A similarly loaded question, after also
having described the activity as not authorized by the Constitution, asked, “is it better for Congress to follow the Constitution or
is it better for Congress to provide funding for the artistic community?” This time, 38 percent chose the spending and 54 percent
urged Congress to follow the Constitution.154
I believe it is all but inconceivable that the body politic would
tolerate a return to a strict Madisonian reading of the spending
power today. This leaves supporters of a strict Madisonian reading with a dilemma as challenging as that faced by their
Hamiltonian counterparts. There is little evidence that the American public has the desire to put the spending power back in the
bottle. There apparently are other societal goals besides reducing
rent-seeking and protecting individual liberty and property rights.
Defenders of the latter goals, despite substantial effort, have
failed to persuade the majority of voters that freedom and property rights can accomplish these goals. Alternatively, they have
failed to persuade their fellow citizens to reorder their priorities.
If these modern Madisonians cannot win the underlying battle
over the size and scope of the federal government, it is unlikely
that the battle over campaign finance regulation will end.
There may be, of course, a way out through compromise. For
example, Professor John Nagle has urged legislative recusal as an
alternative to the regulatory approach of most campaign finance
reforms.155 This would leave citizens free to engage in political activity without constraint, placing the burden on legislators to step
aside in cases of apparent conflict of interest. Professors Ian Ayres
and Jeremy Bulow have argued for mandated donor anonymity as
a way to avoid corruption and rent-seeking, while simultaneously
addressing many of the First Amendment arguments raised
against campaign finance regulation.156 These efforts may be the
cutting-edge of a serious effort to move debate away from traditional, highly regulatory campaign finance reform proposals. At
least in the foreseeable future, however, it is hard to imagine such
proposals gaining any political traction. Further, as is often the
case with efforts at compromise, both sides of the reform debate
Id.
Id.
John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69 (2000).
156 Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
153
154
155
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are likely to find their opponent’s proposals woefully inadequate
in any case.
The problem of campaign finance is largely a problem of government spending and power, and the perception that rent-seeking results from it. A substantial majority of Americans seem
willing to live with an expansive Spending Clause, and a correspondingly expansive central government, in order to accomplish
various other goals that, they apparently believe, government can
accomplish. Whether or not they will tolerate a full-scale assault
on their liberties, in the name of eliminating the corresponding
rent-seeking, remains to be seen.

